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I. SUMMARY
In assessing the state of press freedom in Indonesia, the keyword to look up is insult. It is listed as a crime in a special Title of
the Criminal Code the country inherited from its colonial past. The
word insult, or belediging in the original Dutch language is often
referred to in the Indonesian language as fitnah, an Arabic word.
In the Arabic lexicon, the word fitnah is linked to at least two
* Of Counsel, Makarim & Taira S. Law Firm.
This essay is an updated version of a paper presented to the Law
Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander, Defamation and Freedom of the
Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004.
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references in the Holy Qur’an which define it as more cruel than
murder. Secular laws and religious condemnation lend legitimacy
to judicial intransigence to appeals for the removal of excessively
severe laws against insult. Prosecution, the judiciary, and the
majority of the Indonesian polity demand that the criminalization
of insult be maintained. Those on the other side of social critique,
which include all three branches of the state, want even harsher
punishments, stiffer fines, and larger damage awards. It is civil
society in the French meaning of the term, that is, the collectivity
of persons with individual liberty who objects to jailing critics.
Civil society in transitional democracies, constitutes a tiny minority
in urgent need of organization.
The civil suit against insult is begun by lodging a complaint
with the court. Civil Code Article 1372 allows the plaintiff to
claim real and verifiable damages, and damages for the restoration
of honor and good name. In addition, a defendant may also be
compelled to make public apologies. The article directly links the
civil code with the criminal code’s special Title XVI on Insult and
its 12 articles. The provisions under this title, articles 310-322, set
the size of fines and the terms of imprisonment. The filing of a
civil suit does not bar the public prosecutor from commencing
criminal proceedings against the defendant in the civil case if the
plaintiff had him reported to the police. The insulter may,
therefore, expect a series of punishments consisting of pecuniary
compensation for real damage, awards for restorative damages,
public apologies, criminal fines, and jail terms. Insult is a serious
matter.
In order to come within the scope of insult as defined in the
Criminal Code an accuser must deliberately direct an accusation of
certain facts to the person of the accusee. The civil suit will not be
admitted, and the accuser will escape criminal punishment, if he
has clearly acted in the public interest. The truth of the accusation
is of no importance, unless the accusation was motivated by a
public interest concern, in which case the judge may allow the
accuser to prove the truth of his accusation. These statutory rules
have not been consistently applied by the courts. In one case, an
editor wrote an angry piece sharply criticizing the installation of an
official as member of a city council notwithstanding the council’s
knowledge of the candidate’s involvement in two customs
proceedings. Public interest motive was clearly proven, and truth
of the allegation was established. The editor was sent to jail
anyway. On the other hand, failure to prove the truth of
accusations in other cases got the publications exonerated for
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reasons that they tried to cover both sides, and offered to respect
the insultees’ right of response. Not much guidance in terms of
predictability of the law here. The fact remains that a regime of
laws hostile to criticism, particularly when directed at government,
are retained in the old codes and the new statutes.
Among the restrictive provisions, three sets of laws stand out
as particularly hostile: the so-called hate-sowing articles 154-157,
the “major” lѐse majesté articles 134-137 of the Code regarding
insults directed at the president or the vice president, and the
“lesser” lѐse majesté articles 207 and 208 on insults to government
authorities. While the concordance principle had Indonesia take
over the Dutch codes lock, stock, and barrel, most of these
oppressive provisions are not to be found in the codes of the
Netherlands. They were tailor-made for the colony.
The hate-sowing articles made public expressions of feelings of
hatred, hostility, and contempt against established authority
punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years. These were
formal offences. The mere expression of those feelings is
sufficient for the prosecution to move in with indictments. These
articles were recently challenged in the Constitutional Court and
found to be in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed in the
Indonesian Constitution. The sound decision was a bit marred by
dicta expressing the Court’s relief that a new draft Penal Code
includes the very same provisions, this time as material offences.
Articles 134-137 of the Criminal Code were successfully
challenged as well. The articles protecting the president and vice
president from insults were found by the Constitutional Court to be
in contravention of the basic principle of equality before the law.
The provisions were declared unconstitutional and having no force
of effect, but then the Court proceeded to split both the president
and the vice president in two parts: The part of the individual
person has, like everybody else, recourse to Criminal Code articles
310 et seq when insulted. The presidential and vice presidential
person parts, however, were to remain protected by articles 207
and 208, the “lesser” lѐse majesté provisions in the code.
The principle of equality before the law was maintained by
pronouncing the government dignitaries subject to laws applicable
to everybody else, but promptly set aside this action by placing
them under the protective regulations for government authorities.
The issue with Criminal Code articles 207 and 208 is more
serious than was thought when the articles were simply thrown in
the grab bag of complaints filed with the Constitutional Court. Not
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only were they thought unfit to be placed in the codes of civilized
European nations and, therefore, absent from the Dutch Criminal
Code, they were also deliberately made to make it easier to
prosecute offences which are not punishable under Dutch law.
Criminal Code Article 207 withholds from offenders their right to
the defense of public interest, and removed the judicial discretion
to order offenders to prove the truth of their allegations. The
article which was specifically enacted for governing a subjugated
nation, conflicts with section 2 of article 312, a systemic part of
Title XVI, Book 2 of the Criminal Code. The section allows the
offender to present proof of his accusation against a government
official in the performance of his duties. Thus, a right granted by
law to offenders is revoked by way of choosing which law to apply
for one and the same offence. This is a violation of serious
proportions.
So far Criminal Code Articles 207 and 208 have not been
challenged in the Constitutional Court as a generically different set
of laws from other, equally oppressive provisions in the Criminal
Code. The articles have usually been lumped together with others
in the rush to request their collective repeal. In its decision on the
hate-sowing articles, the Court held the request for constitutional
review of 207 and 208 inadmissible because of a procedural
matter: the Court did not acknowledge petitioners’ legal standing
regarding the articles. In deciding the unconstitutionality of the
lѐse majesté articles, however, the Court gave a clear indication
that a request for constitutional review of Criminal Code Articles
207 and 208 would not be favorably received.
Judging from a number of decisions bearing on freedom of
expression, it seems that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has
decided to opt for the status quo rather than risk controversy. It
has consistently turned down opportunities to confirm change and
lead to a future of accountable governance. This avoidance of
change was not because there are no Asian examples of how courts
have adopted changes gracefully and responsibly. The Korean
Constitutional Court reasoned that too strict an implementation of
the requirement to prove truth and public interest would stifle
press freedom. The Japanese Supreme Court cautioned against
giving too much protection to the honor and good name of
government officials, and promotes the free flow of information
and opinion to enable the people to partake responsibly in political
decision-making. The Indonesian Constitutional Court chose to
maintain colonial and post-independence laws, which are inimical
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to freedom of expression. This was done by way of expounding on
a theory of requisite balances between rights and duties, between
the exercise of freedom and its limitation by the freedom of others.
Balances are conditions of rest. In a context of rapid change, it
conduces to abrupt changes, often violent, and always ill-prepared.
Draconian laws applied, within circumstances sometimes
described as systemic corruption, contribute to abuses of power,
selective prosecution, and miscarriage of justice. Notwithstanding
these serious obstacles to freedom of expression, Indonesia has
been listed as having one of the freest presses in Southeast Asia.
The Indonesian press is presently continuing its multilateral
engagement of the public, the state, and the courts. If the past is of
any guidance, change may have to be seized through careful
legislation and the ponderous processes in the conventional court
hierarchy.
II. INTRODUCTION
In 1941, a year before the Japanese armies routed the Dutch
military force in the then Netherlands East Indies, a middle-aged
well to do Chinese businessman absconded with a 19 year old girl
and carried on weeks of extra-marital activities with her. The daily
newspaper Keng Po took up the story in all its concupiscent
details.1 The rich man appointed a top litigator and sued for libel.
The defendant argued that the victim was only 19, while the
perpetrator had a daughter who was already 17. He also argued
that the despicable act could be construed as concubinage, a
practice forbidden by the Criminal Code, and yet fashionable
among men of means of a specific ethnicity. Keng Po was
promoting a newly emerging ethical movement called New Life,
and felt duty-bound to campaign against this disgraceful behavior.
The write-up was done for the purpose of defending the public
interest, the only excuse the Criminal Code allows to escape
punishment.
The court disagreed and held the newspaper liable for intrusion
into the plaintiff’s private life, adding that the salacious language
used in the coverage of the matter was improper. Ethical
movements must employ ethical words and phrases. Damages in

1. KENG PO, an Indonesian language daily newspaper in its editions of May
20 and 24, and June 10, 1939.
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the amount of f450 (four hundred fifty Dutch colonial guilders)2
was awarded to the plaintiff.3 At no time did the plaintiff contest
the facts stated in the newspaper coverage. The truth was
established, but truth is of little import and easily brushed aside as
insignificant in torts involving defamation. Proving the truth of an
allegation is not a right defendants have under either the Civil
Code or the Criminal Code. It is a favor the judge may bestow
only if the defendant alleges that it was public interest which
moved him to publicize the allegedly libelous statements. Judges
are not obliged to order defendants to prove their allegations even
if they were moved by considerations of public interest. Even
when public interest was accepted, and truth was established, the
defendant will still be punished.4 To establish a valid cause of
action it is sufficient for plaintiff to feel hurt by the allegation
made against him, and that it has done harm to his good name and
reputation.
Armed with the victory in the colony’s capital, the enthused
abductor proceeded to file a suit against a publication in the town
of Semarang covering the same matter. The Semarang court
awarded damages in the amount of f500 but startled the legal
fraternity when it held the writer, the editor and publisher liable as
joint actors in the commission of the offence.5 The decision
contravened consistently upheld rulings of the Dutch Supreme
Court that ex-article 1372 Civil Code damages claims:
(i)
are only admitted against defendants who deliberately
commit the offence,6 and that
(ii)
publishers can be held liable only if they have prior
knowledge of the libelous content of writings appearing
in their publications.7
2. When asked what f450 would be in today’s currency, octogenarians
interviewed recalled that it would probably buy three Raleigh 3-speed bicycles.
3. Raad van Justitie, Batavia First Chamber, August 22, 1941, Tijdschrift
van het Recht (“T”) 154, at 730-731.
4. See infra page 15 and note 36.
5. The Matahari case was referenced in the case report on the Batavia Raad
van Justitie (the Court of First Instance for Europeans and those who had
submitted themselves to the Civil Code by, in this case for instance, by claiming
a cause of action pursuant to Article 1372 of the code) decision, id. at 734. No
separate report on the case is available.
6. Hoge Raad, December 19, 1913, N.J. 1914, at 305 (as cited by the author
of the end-note to the Batavia court decision, writing under the initials of “v.
H.”).
7. Hoge Raad, April 9, 1926, N.J. 1926, at 525 (cited by the same author of
the above-cited end-note.).
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The precedents regarding this matter should by no means be
interpreted as barring damage suits against publishers in an
increasingly complex management structure of modern
newspapers. A negligent publisher can always be held accountable
for libel damages, but the suit ought to be brought on the basis of
his status as employer of the editor. The suit may be filed pursuant
to Article 1367 of the Civil Code which provides that employers
may be held liable for torts committed by their employees.8
Deciding on the choice between an Article 1367 cause of action
and a suit pursuant to Article 1372 has pecuniary consequences.
Courts insist that the measure of damages claimed under the tort
articles proper9 must be strictly confined to real and quantifiable
damage incurred. The fat prize is given to claims under Article
1372 which provides for both quantifiable and immaterial
damages.10
III. STRETCHING TORTS AND DAMAGES
Mr. Cohen lived in Amsterdam. He was in the printing
business. Sometime, in the early twentieth century, he managed to
persuade an employee of Mr. Lindenbaum, his business
competitor, to divulge company secrets in exchange for certain
promises. For an extended period of time Mr. Cohen became the
Dutch Supreme Court precedents may be applied to similar cases in
Indonesia pursuant to the so-called concordance principle. See Sections (1) and
(2) of Article 159 of the Law on the Governance of the State of the Netherlands
East Indies (Law of September 2, 1854, State Gazette of the Netherlands:
S.1854-2, State Gazette of the Netherlands Indies: S. 1855-2 jo 1).
Note also that almost all of the articles of the Indonesian Civil Code,
Commercial Code, Criminal Code, and Civil Procedural Code have their Dutch
code counterpart article numbers printed on the side of each page. Indonesian
law codes are basically old Dutch codes.
8. See “v. H.” end notes to the Batavia court report in T.154, at 735-737; “v.
H.” is thought to be the initials of the very prominent Criminal Law scholar
Professor W.F.C. van Hattum, co-author with Professor J.M. van Bemmelen of
one of the leading texts on Criminal Law, the 2-volume HAND- EN LEERBOEK
VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT.
9. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365-1371.
10. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1372:
The civil suit regarding insult aims at compensating the damage, and at
curing the loss suffered in honor and good name.
In the valuation thereof the judge shall pay attention to the degree of
grossness of the insult, besides the condition, status and the wealth of
the adversaries.
(the unofficial translation from the Dutch original is the author’s).
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recipient of lists of customers, the range of prices charged, and
contents of letters marketing Lindenbaum’s products and services,
all highly confidential information of the competitor’s business.
Mr. Cohen’s business flourished, while Mr. Lindenbaum’s
declined. The cause of this unfortunate course of event was soon
discovered, and Mr. Lindenbaum sued for damages under the civil
code’s general tort article 1401.11 On 18 March 1918 the Court of
Appeal in Amsterdam rejected Lindenbaum’s claim on the theory
that Cohen did not commit any act which was prohibited under the
law.12 The fault element, indispensible for the determination of a
tort, was missing. Lindenbaum appealed, and the Supreme Court
gave him what he wanted, and in the process shocked the Dutch
legal community.13 The core article for tort, literally an unlawful
act, Indonesian Civil Code Article 1365, required the presence of
the following elements:
(i)
the commission or omission of an act;
(ii)
the act is unlawful; hence the existence of a fault;
(iii) the act has caused harm to another person or property
owned by another;
(iv)
the harm is caused directly and immediately after the
Act;
The decision by the highest court in the Netherlands held that,
in addition to the aforementioned ingredients, tort could also be
established if the defendant’s action is:
(v)
in conflict with his obligation, or
(vi)
violates the principle of morality, or
(vii) contravenes the duty of care, or propriety in social
interaction towards other persons, or towards the
property of others.
The decision became a precedent in the Netherlands and,
through the concordance principle,14 was faithfully followed by
courts in Indonesia. It was occasionally, either by mistake or
11. The referenced article number is for the Dutch Civil Code (old); its
Indonesian counterpart is INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365.
12. The Cohen-Lindenbaum case, Hooggerechtshof (court of appeal) of
Amsterdam, March 18, 1918, N.J. 1918, at 1094; see also A. PITLO, HET
VERBINTENISSENRECHT NAAR HET NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK WETBOEK 218219 (3rd print. 1952).
13. The Cohen-Lindenbaum case, Hoge Raad, January 31, 1919, N.J. 1919,
at 161; it was said that the aim and consequence of the decision was like the
introduction of a new Book in the civil code. See also H.F.A. VÖLLMAR,
INLEIDING NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT, N.V. 467 (Uitgevers-Maatschappij
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1955).
14. See supra note 6.
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design, used by plaintiffs to expand the reach of the special tort of
insult. On May 24, 1999, one year after the fall of president
Suharto, Time Magazine came out with an issue covering the
financial exploits of a family who had been in power in Indonesia
for over 32 years.15 The coverage used terms and phrases such as:
(i)
Suharto Inc.
(ii)
How Indonesia’s longtime boss built a family fortune;
and
(iii) A staggering sum of money linked to Indonesia had
been shifted from a bank in Switzerland to another in
Austria, now considered a safer haven for hush bank
deposits.
The family sued Time for libel. The case was thrown out by
both the court of first instance16 and the court of appeal.17 The
Supreme Court, however, overruled the lower courts’ decisions
and awarded damages in the staggering amount of Rp. 189
trillion.18 In its decision, the panel of Justices19 adopted plaintiff’s
argument that the lower courts failed to take sufficient note of
plaintiff’s brief in their reasoning for rejecting the cause of action.
Lawyers for the plaintiff filed their double-barreled claim by using
the general tort article 1365 concurrently with the special tort
article 1372 on insult. Civil Code Article 1365 was resorted to for
its expansive reach pursuant to the 1919 Dutch Supreme Court
decision.20 Obviously, Article 1372 was employed not merely
because it is the legally designated basis for defamation suits, but
more importantly because it allows plaintiff to claim both
quantifiable and verifiable damage, and whatever amount of
money it takes to restore the good name and reputation of the
victim. Having taken advantage of the wide reach of torts pursuant
to Cohen vs Lindenbaum, plaintiff proceeded to substitute the
doctrine of objective criteria for the strict requirement under
Criminal Code Article 310, to prove that the defendant had
15. Major-General Suharto seized power in March 1966 and was forced to
step down in 1998.
16. Suharto v. Time Inc., Central Jakarta District Court, June 6, 2000,
Decision No.338/PDT.G/1999/PN.JKT.PST.
17. Suharto v. Time Inc., Jakarta High Court, March 16, 2001, Decision
No.551/PDT/2000/PT.DKI.
18. Suharto v. Time Inc., Supreme Court, August 30, 2007, Decision No.
3215K/PDT/200. The Rp.-US$ exchange rate at the time was approximately
Rp.10.000,- to the US$.
19. The panel consisted of a military judge, acting as chairman of the panel,
and two religious court judges.
20. See supra note 11.

140

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

committed the defamatory act deliberately.
The doctrine
originated in the cause-and-effect theory of the general tort. It was
alleged that the modern theory of objective criteria has superseded
the ancient dolus and animus injuriandi concepts of the Criminal
Code. The objective criteria theory would have the actor liable if
he was aware that the impact of his deed would result in a specific
effect on the victim. In the heat of an international campaign
against corruption, it wasn’t easy to assess the specific effects of an
investigative report on a fallen leader who had been ill for some
time.21 Domestic and international coverage of the accumulated
wealth of Suharto’s family prior to Time’s May 1999 issue had
been widespread and intensive with no noticeable reaction from
either Suharto himself or his family.22
The Supreme Court almost paraphrased plaintiff’s brief,
overruled the lower courts’ decisions, took over the matter, and
awarded damages in the exact amount demanded by plaintiff.
Upon judicial review a different panel of judges of the same court
overruled the decision, and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.
The court held that Time fulfilled norms governing the activities of
21. Suharto has been in ill health before his forced retirement.
BBCIndonesia.com reported on May 19, 2006 that the fallen leader has had
intensive testing done during a 3-day stay (July 9-11, 1996) at the Heart Center
in Bad Oeyenhausen, Germany; he suffered a light stroke on July 20, 1999 and
was rushed to the hospital, and since then had been in and out of hospital for
bleeding intestines, appendicitis operations, pace-maker implant, lung infection,
difficulty in breathing, and high fevers. In August 2002 the Indonesian Supreme
Court ordered the suspension of court proceedings against Suharto pending an
examination on his condition of frequent lapses of memory, emotional flare-ups
due to irritation caused by incapacity to express thoughts in words, and speaking
difficulty reducing communication to 4 words at a time. See on the late
president,
IndonesiaNow
BlogSpot,
available
at
http://theindonesianowulasan.blogspot.com/2008/01/jejak-soeharto-di-rumahsakit.html (last visited July 10, 2010).
22. Note that the Time publication at issue was the investigative report
appearing in its Volume 153, No. 20, of May 24, 1999. That was preceded by
the daily MERDEKA on September 15, 1998 likening Suharto to the Pharaoh
depicted in religious texts as the epitome of evil and sinfulness; the daily
KOMPAS on November 17, 1998 carrying a report that the assembly of all
university rectors in the country demanded the tracing of Suharto’s assets; the
newsweekly magazine GATRA on August 15, 1998 had a caricature on its cover
depicting a drowning Suharto in a basket with US$100 bills and the caption in
big letters Assets of Cendana [i.e. Suharto’s private residence] in Switzerland
and Austria; THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW A Monopoly is Forever
(February 26, 1987); THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 6, 1998):
SUHARTO Inc.; Things Fall Apart, THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
(May 13, 1999); and many more publications.
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the press, and the content and wording of the coverage were within
the scope of journalistic ethics. It concluded that the investigative
report in question did not meet the requirements for it to be
adjudged an unlawful act.23 The Judicial Review panel, headed by
Chief Justice Tumpa, indicated that the May 24, 1999, Time issue
should be seen within the context of the national anti-corruption
campaign. The court stated that the media’s depiction of former
president Suharto as a target of investigation must not be deemed
an intent to defame. It was the People’s Consultative Assembly,
the nation’s highest political authority, which passed a resolution
mandating the investigation of the former president.24 The Court
finally ruled that defamation suits should be exclusively filed
under Civil Code Article 1372.25 That seems to confirm the
communis opinio doctorum that for tort without deliberateness the
plaintiff is directed to seek remedies offered by Civil Code Articles
1365-1371, and that suits against deliberate insults are dealt with
by Civil Code Articles 1372-1380, with specific reference to
Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq. It has led scholars to refer to
Civil Code Articles 1365-1371 as the lex generalis of tort, and
Articles 1372-1380 as the lex specialis26 for the specific tort of
insult.
The distinction is of special importance for pecuniary and
procedural purposes. Under Civil Code Articles 1365-1371,
plaintiffs may only sue for damages which are quantifiable and
verifiable. These must be real, calculated in detail, and supported
by evidence. The general tort articles do not support claims for
immaterial damages unless the tort resulted in a death or
permanent disability.27 Claims for immaterial damages to restore
23. The Supreme Court’s Judicial Review decision is cited as
No.273PK/PDT/2008 of April 16, 2009.
24. PEOPLE’S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (Ketetapan,
sometimes abbreviated as Tap) No. XI/MPR/1998 of November 13, 1998.
25. This view finds considerable support in the leading texts on private law.
See C. ASSER, HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET NEDERLANDS
BURGERLIJK RECHT, Derde Deel – Verbintenissenrecht, Tweede Stuk: De
Overeenkomst en de Verbintenis Uit de Wet, bewerkt door Mr. L.E.H. Rutten,
N.V. Uitgevers-Maatschappij, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle (1954), at 619.
26. Jan de Meij, Freedom of the Press and Defamation in the Netherlands,
unpublished paper submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander,
Defamation and Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004.
27. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1370 and 1371 allow for claims for loss of
support for the family of the victim of a tort resulting in death, and for claims for
the loss of livelihood in case the victim is incapacitated for life due to injuries
sustained as a consequence of the tort.
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the victim’s good name and reputation must be based on an action
against insult, and the suit must be based on Civil Code Articles
1372-1380.
Another feature of importance in distinguishing the lex
specialis of the tort of insult from the general tort provisions, the
lex generalis, is that the former is not self-contained within the
private law system. In order to define insult, one has to consult the
Criminal Code. Historically, Civil Code Articles 1365-1380 were
part of the original civil code which was promulgated in 1847.28
But articles 1372-1380 were substantially amended in 1917 linking
them closer to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural
Code.29 The amendments were announced in the State Gazette
which promulgated the Dutch Criminal Code in the colony.30 Six
of the 9 articles on defamation have clear links mentioned in the
articles with the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes.31 Only
two of the general tort articles share this feature.32 Finally, the
most obvious distinction between the general tort of Civil Code
Articles 1365-1371 and the special tort articles 1372-1380 is that
the former insist on the presence of the element of fault, culpa,
while the latter come into motion upon proof of dolus,
deliberateness, the animus injuriandi.
Note that the Court of First Instance, adjudicating the Suharto
vs. Time suit, found no cause of action in its decision on June 6,
2000, and that the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s
judgment on March 16, 2001. There was a wait of no less than 6
years before a Supreme Court panel overturned the lower courts’
decisions, and awarded a spectacular Rp. 1 trillion damages to the
plaintiff. In the meantime, another celebrated case was making its
way to court.

28. STAATSBLAD (State Gazette) 1847 No. 23.
29. Reference to the changes are provided (between brackets) in lines before
the texts of articles 1372, 1373, 1375-1377, and 1380.
30. STAATSBLAD 1917 No. 497.
31. Explicit references, at the end of the wording of the article, are called
schakel bepalingen (linked provisions) to either the criminal code and the
Criminal Procedural Code are to be found in INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1372,
1373, and 1376-1379.
32. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365 on general tort refers to criminal code
article 382bis on unfair competition or fraudulence in competition, introduced
through STAATSBLAD 1920-556, quite possibly in response to the CohenLindenbaum decision, while INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1368 (on liability of
owners of animals for harm done by the animals) stipulates a link to criminal
code article 490 regarding the control of dangerous animals.
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Big fires, in traditional bazaars, in Indonesia are almost always
followed by the construction of modern shopping centers,
supermarkets, and malls. The fires are as a rule preceded by failed
negotiations to persuade existing tenants to move to temporary
quarters pending the completion of their new, and more expensive
shops in the newly built premises. There has always been a
suspicion, but no proof, that the developers somehow had
something to do with the fires. In 2003 a major fire broke out in
Pasar Tanah Abang, probably one of Southeast Asia’s largest
garment and textile markets. Tempo, the leading national
newsweekly, covered the fire and mentioned the name of a
developer with close links to the army as a party who was highly
interested in a new Pasar Tanah Abang project.33 Sensing the
hidden accusation, and irritated by the use of certain terms in the
coverage, the developer sued for libel. The Central Jakarta Court
of First Instance agreed with plaintiff that the investigative report
was libelous, and awarded damages in the amount of
Rp.500.000.000,- (five hundred million rupiah),34 and a penalty of
Rp.300.000,- (three hundred thousand rupiah) for each day of
delay in paying the awarded sum. The court also ordered the
placement of a public apology in several newspapers with a
national circulation.35 The defendant appealed, and the High Court
overruled the lower court’s decision and took over the adjudication
of the matter. The court rejected the damages claim for reasons
that plaintiff had not submitted detailed and convincing
quantification in arriving at the claimed amount. The Court also
ruled that Tempo had correctly balanced out its freedom of
expression by providing for the citizen’s right of response.36 In
2005, the Indonesian Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s appeal and
affirmed the High Court’s decision.37
IV. DISREGARD OF THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” DEFENSE
In order to be successful with a suit for material and immaterial
damages under Civil Code Article 1372, a court of law must
33. THE WEEKLY TEMPO (March 3-9, 2003).
34. Equivalent to US$53,000 at the rate prevailing in June 2010.
35. Tomy Winata vs Tempo, Decision of the Central Jakarta Court of First
Instance, No.233/Pdt.G/2003/P.N. Jkt.Pst., on March 18, 2004.
36. Decision of the Jakarta High Court No.314/PDT/2004/P.T. DKI, dated
September 3, 2004.
37. Decision of the Supreme Court No.903K/PDT/2005, dated February 9,
2006.
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establish that the defendant’s act meets the requirements set forth
in Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq. The act must be:
(i)
deliberate;
(ii)
an assault against the good name and reputation of the
victim;
(iii) an accusation of a certain fact;
(iv)
with the clear aim to publicize the fact.
Pre-independence court decisions had borne out that for the
printed media the requirements set out above under items (i) and
(iv) were deemed met by the mere fact of publication.38 Although
the public interest motive is the only way to escape punishment,
the concept is underdeveloped due to the scarcity of decisions
establishing guidelines. Public interest is known more for what it
is not, than what it is. During the colonial era, court reports have
recorded only one case where defense of public interest was
successful.39 The matter involved an editor of a daily newspaper
published in Surabaya, a major harbor city in East Java. The editor
allowed two unsigned articles to appear in his paper warning
readers that a city council member scheduled to be installed was
facing two customs suits, and should never be admitted to sit on
the council. Notwithstanding the warnings the installation was
carried through. This prompted the editor to release a harsh article
criticizing the government department. The colony’s highest court
rejected the prosecution’s count of defamation, but affirmed the
lower court’s finding that the editor afforded the offender, the
writer whose identity the editor refused to disclose, with the
opportunity to publish the punishable article. The public interest
excuse was admitted, but the editor received a 3-day jail sentence
for being an accessory to the offence committed by the
unidentified offender. In addition for being locked up for 3 days,
he was charged the costs of the proceedings in both the lower and

38. None of the court decisions cited in this essay raised the issues of
deliberateness and publicity which are central to a determination whether a
criminal code article 310 “insult” was indeed committed. There is solid
doctrinal support for this position in HAZEWINKEL-SURINGA, INLEIDING TOT DE
STUDIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT 584 (15 ed., updated by J.
Remmelink, 1966), and II T.J. NOYON, HET WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT 256257 (6th ed., updated by G.E. Langemeijer, 1954).
39. Hooggerechtshof (the highest court in the colony) van NederlandschIndië, Second Chamber, Decision July 30, 1924 regarding the defamation of a
public authority or complicity to it, on appeal regarding the defense of having
acted in the public interest, T.121, at 451.
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the appeals courts. Truth and the public interest were not
considered judicially sufficient reasons to let him walk free.
V. THE HORSE, THE RIDER, AND THE LAW
The term pers delict or “press offence” does not constitute a
separate class of offences within the Indonesian criminal law
system. Most of the offences termed pers delict are general
offences committed by persons, including journalists, writers,
editors, and publishers. Most of the provisions curtailing media
freedom are to be found in the Criminal Code.40
Using the pen-name Multatuli,41 Eduard Douwes Dekker,
wrote Max Havelaar, or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading
Company, a novel dealing with plunder, oppression and extortion
of the Javanese by their feudal masters. The book, first published
in 1860, accused the colonial authorities of knowing about the
mistreatments, and yet choosing to do nothing against it.
Translated in 34 languages, an English version came out in 1868.
It was reported that a shiver went through Europe when the book
appeared.42 The author lost his job in the colonial administration,
and wrote many letters to friends and editors. One of those letters
contained the following famous phrase: “Insulinde43 is a
magnificent horse. Its rider is a thief.”44
One Sunday morning at 09:00 on September 3, 1922, the Indies
Social Democratic Party convened a congress, at the Oriental
Movie Theatre, in the West Javanese town of Bandung. There, on
40. Criminal code articles 61 and 62 on requirements to be met if editors
and publishers are to be exempted from prosecution; Criminal code articles 207
and 208 on insults directed to state authorities (the articles release the judge
from an optional obligation of granting the right of defendants to prove their
allegations); criminal code articles 310-328 defining insult, libel, slander,
deliberateness, and the punishments for committing the offence; criminal code
articles 155-157, the so-called hatred-sowing articles against statements,
writings, posters containing expressions of hatred, hostility, and contempt
against government, or ethnic, religious, and racial groups; criminal code article
160 prohibiting the advocacy of civil disobedience.
41. Latin for I have suffered much.
42. The first English translation from the original manuscript was done
by Baron Alphonse Nahuijs, Edmonton & Douglas (Edinburgh, 1868);
see
a
Dutch
edited
version,
available
at
http://cf.hum.uva.nl/dsp/ljc/multatuli/havelaar/index.html (last visited July 10,
2010).
43. A poetic name for Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world.
44. Letter written to G.J.A. Boulet, April 5, 1876, published in volumes of
collected writings of the author cited as VW XVIII, at 333.
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the door handle of the movie house, young party enthusiasts hung a
white cardboard with precisely that phrase written in big letters.
The prosecution moved to indict on the basis of Criminal Code
Article 154, the so-called hate-sowing article. Article 154
prohibits people from publicly expressing hatred, hostility, and
contempt against government, or population groups in the colony.
The subsequent articles add the requirement of intentional
publicity, and expand the target audience to population groups
distinguished by race, religion, ethnicity, descent or nationality.
The court found the phrase insulting. It also found the presence of
elements required under article 154, including the aim to publicize
or increase exposure in view of the location of the cinema on a
busy public road by the town square.45 The defendants were fined
f300, which was convertible to a 2-months jail term if the
offenders failed to pay up within two months of sentencing. On
appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s judgment.46
Article 154 of the Criminal Code used to read “. . . whosoever
arouses or promotes feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt . . .”
That was indeed how it read in the Dutch Criminal Code. In 1918,
at the behest of the then Dutch Minister of Colonies, changes were
made to the colony’s version of the provision. It was then made to
read “. . . whosoever expresses feelings of hostility, hatred, and
contempt . . .” The change did away with the requirement of
evidence of the prohibited arousal and promotion. The erstwhile
material offence was turned into a formal offence. Henceforth, it
was enough for a person to merely express the forbidden feelings,
for that person to be sentenced to a jail term up to a maximum of 7
years. It was only on July 17, 2007, and 62 years after
independence, that the Constitutional Court declared Criminal
Code Articles 154 and 155 in contravention with the human rights
guarantees in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.47
Emerging from a different era in the evolution of perceptions
about government and the state, the Indonesian Criminal Code
carries provisions which are excessively hostile to the media.
Articles 207 and 208 stand out as being particularly ill-disposed to
45. Raad van Justitie Batavia, Second Chamber, April 6, 1923, T. 120, at
496-500.
46. Hooggerechtshof, Second Chamber, June 6, 1923, T. 120, at 496 and
500-501.
47. Constitutional Court Decision No. 6/PUU-V/2007. The Decision was
limited to criminal code articles 154 and 155. The request to find the notorious
criminal code articles 207 and 208 (insults against public authorities)
unconstitutional was rejected.
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freedom of opinion and social critique. The articles deal with
insults directed against government agencies, and dispense with
the basic principle that only natural persons are capable of feeling
insulted. Fictitious persons, like the limited liability, can make
insulting allegations through members of its board of
management,48 and can even incur damages caused by defamatory
remarks at their expense. However, the cause of action does not lie
with the special tort of insult, but rather with the general tort
regime of Civil Code Articles 1365-1371. With Criminal Code
Articles 207 and 208, we have a corporate entity called
government, or its agencies capable of feelings thought to be
invested exclusively in the human person.
Early 1938, the colony was feasting. The Royal House of
Orange-Nassau was expecting the birth of Princess Beatrix, and
the daily newspaper Keng Po was at it again. It published an
article under the heading of For the Knowledge of the Resident of
Serang.49 A Resident was the highest Dutch colonial authority in
the residency, a region which would now be equivalent to either a
province, or half of it, depending on the area’s economic
importance to the colonial administration. The article told the
story of festivities prepared, by the Bupati,50 of Pandeglang in the
town square using local bamboo and manpower without paying for
either. The poor villagers, already living a subsistence life, were
sunk deeper into poverty, but nobody dared to protest because the
order was given by the Bupati himself. The article ended with the
sentence: “If that were true . . . why make the people sad when
jubilation is in order for the House of Orange-Nassau?”51
Criminal Code Article 207 was used by the prosecution
because the article does not afford the judge with the prerogative
of allowing the defendant to prove the truth of his allegation. The
use of the article was intimated in private to the scholar who wrote
the end note to the law report on the decision as de rigueur among
prosecutors in the colony.52 The court of first instance rejected the
48. As with employer’s liability for tort committed by employees, the
limited liability company may escape liability for a director’s libelous act if the
act was committed outside the scope of work for which the director was
contracted to perform.
49. The Keng Po (Pandeglang) case, Raad van Justitie Batavia, November
3, 1938, T. 149, at 67.
50. The Bupati is the highest ranking authority in the hierarchy of the local
indigenous bureaucracy.
51. See supra note 46.
52. Id. at 74.
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application of Criminal Code Article 207 for the simple reason that
the insult was directed to the person of the Bupati, not to the
Netherlands Indies administration as a body.53 The court ruled that
Criminal Code Article 310 was the more correct article to apply to
the matter at hand. The prosecution was not satisfied and appealed
to the colony’s highest court. On November 29, 1938, the colony’s
Court of Appeal, Second Chamber in Batavia, ruled that the lower
court had erred in its opinion that the insult was directed to the
person of the Bupati , and not to the organ of the administration: “.
. . Wasn’t the aggrieved party called the Regent of Pandeglang?,”
the court queried. “. . . It was indeed directed to a person, to be
precise. But it is a person equipped with a public authority!”54
Article 207 applied. Seventy years passed. Insulinde, the
magnificent horse had become independent. The colonial rider
had been chased away. He didn’t take 207 with him. The new
rider likes it.
In October 2007, a writer by the name of Bersihar Lubis wrote
a piece for the Tempo Daily criticizing the burning of banned
books per order of the Attorney General.55 The heading of his
article was “The Story of the Dumb Interrogator.” Lubis wrote
about the interrogation by prosecutors of a certain Joesoef Isak,
publisher of novels written by the left-leaning author Pramoediya
Ananta Toer. Isak recounted to Lubis the reason given him by the
prosecutor why he was summoned for the interview:
“Pramoediya’s books have the smell of Marxism . . .” The
prosecutor later intimated that he actually carried out the summons
and interview because his superior wanted him to. Personally he
liked Pramoediya’s books. To this Isak commented to Bersihar
Lubis that a decision on the basis of a command is dumb. It was
the inclusion of this word, dumb, in his article that got Lubis into
trouble. The prosecutor’s office in the Depok district reported the
matter to the police. Eight months later Bersihar Lubis attended
his trial at the Depok court of first instance for insulting a
government agency. The court found him guilty of libel and
sentenced him to a jail term of 1 month with a probationary period
of 3 months, a considerably lighter punishment than the 8 months
demanded by the prosecution.56 Both parties appealed, and the
53. Id. at 65-68.
54. Id. at 69.
55. KORAN TEMPO, March 17, 2007.
56. The Bersihar Lubis case Decision, The Depok Court of First Instance,
February 20, 2008 (unpublished).
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High Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.57 At the time of
writing this essay, the case is still on final appeal at the Supreme
Court.
Bersihar Lubis and friends challenged the constitutionality of
the jailing provisions in the criminal code before the Constitutional
Court, particularly in the face of Indonesia’s constitutional
provisions protecting the freedom of expression and freedom from
fear.58
The request was for a material review of the jailing provisions
of Criminal Code Articles 310, 311, and 316. The petitioners also
requested a review of the constitutionality of Criminal Code
Article 207 due to its implication of the privileged position granted
to government agencies before the law, a violation of constitutional
principle of equality before the law. In its decision on August 15,
2008 the Court found each and every petitioned criminal code
articles in accord with the Constitution upon the following
reasoning:
(i)
no freedom may be exercised without limitation;
(ii)
freedoms may be limited by considerations of public
order, moral and public health, national security, rights
and reputation of others, and limitations based on
necessity in a democratic society, on the condition that
the limitations must be prescribed by law;
(iii) “The need for separate protection of public officials in
the exercise of their duty (is warranted) because in their
function, besides involving the subjective element of
the individual person of the official, there is also an
objective element of the institution which requires
credibility, authority, and capability in order to
effectively perform their public duties.”59
(iv)
the request relating to the preference of fines over
incarceration has to do with the judicial application of
the law, not with its constitutionality.60

57. Mr. Hendrayana of the Press Legal Aid Institute told the author that on
May 24, 2010 the High Court affirmed the Depok District Court (Court of First
Instance) decision.
58. Request for review dated May 7, 2008 listed by the Court Registrar on
May 12, 2008 under registration Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, corrected on June 3,
2008.
59. Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, August 15,
2008, at 286.
60. Id. at 287.

150

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

The decision contrasts unfavorably with the views of the
commentator expressed in the End Note to the decision of the
colonial Hooggerechtshof (Second Chamber) of November 29,
1938 in the Keng Po (Pandeglang) case.61 Commenting on the
Court’s support for the use of Criminal Code Article 207 by the
standing magistrate to catch offences which according to the
Dutch Criminal Code are not punishable, Professor W.F.C. van
Hattum declared that such a position contravenes the very system
of criminal law. He referred to Criminal Code Article 312 Section
2 which provides that when a government official is accused of a
certain fact in the performance of his duties, the law allows the
accuser to prove that fact. It violates this system if that right to
prove the accusation is withheld by prosecuting the accuser
pursuant to a statute not written for this case. The law was
introduced exclusively to cover cases of insult which are not
punishable according to Dutch law. The distinction between insult
to the person and insult to the authority of the person is not only
difficult to discern, it is also not acceptable if offenders of article
207 are not guaranteed the right of not being punished if they acted
in the public interest. The right to critique is to some extent
guaranteed under article 312 section 2. “. . . If this guarantee is
rendered worthless by simply disqualifying the application of
article 310, and replacing it by article 207, we would be taking
another step on the road to the police-state.”62
VI. LEX SPECIALIS, OR “DROIT DE RÉPONSE”?
For over four decades, the Indonesian press suffered closures
of newspapers and imprisonment of journalists under either
oppressive dictatorships, or harsh treatment by the law. The day of
liberation came, or so it was widely assumed, when a new press
law was promulgated in 1999.63 The law states that under no
circumstances will there ever be any closures of newspapers by the
state.64 Any measure which has the effect of curtailing the
freedom of the press will be fined.65 Victims of libelous
publications have the right to respond, and the media publishing
the libelous allegations have the obligation to fulfil that right.66
61. T. 149, at 71-74.
62. Id. at 74.
63. Law No. 40 of 1999 Regarding the Press.
64. Id. at Article 4, Section (2).
65. Id. at Article 18, Section (1).
66. Id. at Article 5, Sections (1) and (2).
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The law also establishes a Press Council to act as a watchdog of
ethics of journalism.67 The government, the media, and parliament
celebrated the law as the lex specialis for all possible offences
committed by the media. The Press Law was widely hailed as
governing all activities of the print media and, therefore, rendering
inapplicable all other laws relating to the press. In the ensuing
debates, it was mentioned that even if no consensus can be reached
about its lex specialis status the matter can be settled simply by a
Supreme Court Circular declaring it to be so.68 The courts
disagree, and rightly so.
The Press Law of 1999 was never meant to function as a selfcontained and exclusive regime governing the media. It is by no
means a collection of primary rules on a specific matter demanding
priority over secondary rules provided by a lex generalis. The law
itself in two instances, one in the body of the text, and another in
its official elucidation refers to other laws as still applicable.69 A
cursory examination would also show that the Press Law bears
some resemblance with the nineteenth century Reglement op de
Drukwerken,70 a piece of legislation normally referred to in legal
texts as the droit de réponse. It provides a right for victims to
respond to defamatory press coverage.71
An interesting decision on this matter was issued by the
Batavia Court of First Instance72 on March 7, 1935.73 The court
ruled that the droit de réponse of Article 19 of the Reglement op de
Drukwerken aimed at providing the victim of libelous acts with an
opportunity to defend himself within the forum of the offender by
way of a response to reach the same readers. A complaint filed
with the court, in the matter of an insult, on the other hand, merely
aims to enable the state to prosecute a punishable act which, absent
67. Id. at Chapter V, Article 15.
68. KOMPAS DAILY, July 19, 2004, at 7.
69. Article 19 of Law No. 40 of 1999 provides that all provisions of law
bearing on the press which were still in effect at the time the Press Law was
promulgated will remain so insofar as they do not conflict with, or have not been
replaced by new laws arising out of the Press Law. The official elucidation of
article 12 of the law stipulates that criminal liability is still governed by the
criminal code.
70. Regulation on Printed Matter, STAATSBLAD 1856-74, after being
reduced from 35 to 10 articles.
71. Id. at article 19.
72. The court known as Landgerecht was, much like the Raad van Justitie,
the court of first instance for Europeans during the German occupation of the
Netherlands.
73. T. 142 at 773.
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a complaint would not be possible. The droit de réponse and the
filing of a complaint with the court are two causes which may be
pursued independently from each other. The filing of a complaint
with the court in no way bars the plaintiff from making use of his
right to reply.74
There may well have been a time when the belief prevailed that
the Reglement op de Drukwerken was some kind of a special law
applicable to special offences, sometimes called pers delicten or
press offences, committed by a special group of people such as
writers, editors, publishers, and even printers. The Reglement
itself was a solid 35-articles piece of legislation when it was issued
in the mid-nineteenth century. Looking at the regulation now
shows that 16 of the 35 articles were withdrawn, while 9 articles
were repealed with the entry into force of the Criminal Code.
Punishable offences committed by the printing press, which were
originally in the Reglement, were taken out and put in the Criminal
Code. The measure was probably motivated by the difficulties in
defining press offences. To be sure, it represents a certain group of
offences, but as a law category it is considered too limiting to
deserve the attribute of a lex specialis. Offences committed by
using the print media are only part of a larger category of offences
involving, among others, public disclosures of thoughts and
feelings. Press offences strictly relate to the means of such
disclosures, not to the punishable offence of the disclosure itself.
Articles in the Criminal Code prohibiting disclosure of secrets, for
instance, cannot be categorized as press offences as understood by
the law. Neither publicity, nor the public exposure of a thought is
required under those articles. The 9 articles removed from the
Reglement op de Drukpers were not considered press offences
proper, but were offences of a more general nature which could be
committed through the print media.
VII. SOLUTIONS, COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING
Most code provisions on defamation are more or less similar in
civil code countries in Asia, be they Germanic or French in origin.
In South Korea, both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme
Court have chosen the creatively path-breaking route to respond to
the changing times. On June 24, 1999 the Korean Constitutional
Court pronounced that the standard of scrutiny in the
criminalization of libel should be more strictly applied when the
74. Id.
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victim is a private person rather than a public figure, and the matter
alleged is of private rather than of public concern.75 Matters of
public concern, thus the Court, have to do with the public right to
know, in order for the public to responsibly participate in political
decision-making in a democracy. The Court underscored the
chilling effect of criminal libel law on freedom of the press:
If the requirement of libel defenses (truth and only for
public interest) under the Criminal Code are too narrowly
applied, the scope of criminal sanctions will expand and
press freedom will shrink. If criminal punishment is used
to preclude criticism and debates about matters of public
concern, freedom of the press will be suffocated and the
balancing scale will be tipped too far towards reputational
protection.76
In both Korea and Japan, “truth and the public interest” are
formidable defenses against Criminal Code punishment. In a
decision dated February 27, 2004 the Korean Supreme Court held
that a defendant is not liable if there is proof of the truth of his
allegation, or the belief that the accusation is true notwithstanding
the absence of evidence.77 This applies even if there is only a
reasonable ground to believe that the defamatory allegations are
true. The burden of proof, however, remains with the media.
Similarly, the Japanese Supreme Court held in a case decided
as early as June 25, 1969 that the defendant needs only to prove
that the statement was made under the mistaken but reasonable
belief, based on reliable materials and a reliable source, that it was
true.78 Statements made in good faith are not actionable because
they do not indicate a criminal intent on the part of the publisher.
The Japanese also made a couple of conceptual refinements.
The ‘truth’ defense concept, for instance, applied only in cases
where defamation was inflicted on public figures. The private
75. Cited as “Constitutional Court, 97 Honma 265, June 24, 1999,” in Kyu
Ho-youm, Press Freedom and Defamation in South Korea, , unpublished paper
submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander, Defamation and
Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004, at 26.
76. Id. at 27-28.
77. Id. cited as “Supreme Court 2001, Ta 53387, February 27, 2004”, at 25.
78. The Yukan Wakayama Jiji case, cited as “23 Keishu 975, Supreme
Court, June 25, 1969” in Masao Horibe, A Draft on Defamation and Freedom of
the Press in Japan, unpublished paper submitted at Law Colloquium 2004:
From Insult to Slander, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 2829, 2004, at 25.
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person-public figure dichotomy was removed from its black-andwhite realm. In 1981 the Japanese Supreme Court held that even
the private behavior of a private person could be of public concern
depending on the nature of the person’s social activities and the
extent of his influence in society.79 The decision concerned
improprieties carried out by a Daisaku Ikeda, honorary chairman
of a Buddhist lay organization, towards two women members of
the organization.
Japan’s doctrine of popular sovereignty, a prominent principle
in the nation’s constitution, provides the rationale for the reduced
protection of public officials against allegations thrown at their feet
because they are “servants of the whole community” and,
therefore, subjected to the people’s will to hire or fire.80 The
doctrine is of particular interest because most national constitutions
carry the same principle, but very few gave it the legal
interpretation as far-reaching as Japan’s.
The Indonesian judiciary is timid, cautiously conformist, more
conventional, and less progressive compared to their East Asian
counterparts. They prefer not to lead. In this regard, the
Constitutional Court is more consistently so, while the Supreme
Court occasionally issues a serendipitous decision or two. The
latter’s decision on the Suharto vs. Time review matter81 was both
painful, since the Court had to censure its own decision,82 and
clear-sighted. It annulled the Supreme Court decision of August
30, 2007, viewed Time’s coverage within the context of national
campaigns against corruption, saw no intention of Time to defame
Suharto mainly because the People’s Consultative Assembly in its
resolution had mandated the investigation of Suharto’s assets. A
major issue it cleared up was that suits for damages due to insults
must be exclusively conducted pursuant to Civil Code Article
1372.
Compared to the image of valiant resolve emerging from the
Time review decision, the outcome of one of the many Tempo
matters came across as listless. In March 2003, in the wake of the
Tempo coverage of the big fire at Pasar Tanah Abang, the office of
the weekly news magazine was visited by a group of angry people.
The editors of the magazine felt themselves threatened and
79. Id. at 24-25, the Gekkan Pen. Case, cited as “1000 Hanrei Jiho 25,
Supreme Court, April 16, 1981.”
80. Id. at 26.
81. Supra note 23.
82. Supra notes 18, 15, and 16.
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reported the matter to the police. Coming out from the police
station, a senior editor explained to the media who were gathered
outside that Tempo demanded the attack to be fully investigated,
lest the country would fall into the hands of gangsters. The
businessman whose employees paid the visit to Tempo’s offices
felt insulted and filed a suit under Civil Code Article 1372 against
the senior editor, the daily newspaper Koran Tempo which
reported the senior editor’s statement, and the company publishing
the newspaper.83 The damages demanded ran up to Rp. 1 billion
for actual damage incurred, and Rp. 20 billion for restoring good
name and reputation.84 Additionally, plaintiff demanded that
defendants issued public apologies in 4 daily newspapers,
including the defendants’ newspaper, the attachment for security
purposes of the residence of the senior editor and the newspaper’s
office spaces, and a daily late performance penalty of Rp.10
million. The court of first instance found the defendants guilty of
the tort of insult, rejected the plaintiff’s damages claims because of
insufficient precision in itemizing, calculating the amount
demanded. The court lifted the attachment of the senior editor’s
residence, but ordered the defendants to issue the public apologies
with the claimed daily late performance penalty.85 The Jakarta
Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision, but the senior
editor lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court rejected
the appeal,86 and Chief Justice Harifin Tumpa suggested that the
editor offer his apologies to the plaintiff.87 The Supreme Court
decision vacated the Rp.1 billion fine, and reduced the daily Rp.1
million penalty for performance delays.
Lawyers for the
defendants were quick in their response that a Judicial Review will
be lodged with the Supreme Court. Harifin Tumpa, Chief Justice
83. Tomy Winata vs Gunawan Mohamad (the senior editor), KORAN TEMPO
(the daily newspaper), and P.T. Tempo Inti Media Harian (the publisher of the
daily newspaper).
84. The Rp.:US$ exchange rate in 2003 was between Rp.8897,20 (January)
and Rp.8487,75 (December) according to x-rates.com, available at
http://www.x-rates.com/d/IDR/USD/hist2003.html (last visited July 10, 2010).
85. Decision of the East Jakarta Court of First Instance
No.180/PDT.G/2003/PN.JKT.TIM (unpublished).
86. No reports were available of either the High Court decision, or the
Supreme Court rejection of the appeal. The information about the appeal and
rejection of the appeal was published in VIVA NEWS of August 13-14, 2009,
available
at
http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/82892ma_tak_gunakan_uu_pers; and http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/82694goenawan_mohamad_ajukan_peninjauan_ (last visited July 10, 2010).
87. Id.
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of the Supreme Court, was asked why he chose not to reprimand
the lower courts for not consulting the Press Council in arriving at
their decisions,88 as he recommended in a recent instruction.
Justice Tumpa answered that no instructions were issued, only an
appeal. Judges should not be told what law to apply as that would
violate judicial independence, he said. When asked what was to be
done when lower courts refused to comply with the appeal, he
referred to the institution of the judicial review as a last resort.89 It
never came to that. The last news heard about the case was that
plaintiff and defendants got together on October 6, 2009, had
dinner, and made peace.90
VIII. SOMETHING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO FREEDOM
A focus on the work of the Constitutional Court produces glum
perspectives not only because of its authoritarian proclivities
evident in their decisions regarding the Blasphemy Law,91 the
Pornography Law,92 and maintenance of the Film Censor Board.93
Reading through the detailed and timely produced reports of
decisions it was not easy to suppress a sense of déjà vu. The tone
in these decisions was paternalistic, gentle but steely, and
convincingly set on a course of rolling back liberties perceived as
having gone too far. The court meticulously maintained a clinical
separation between the law on the books and its interpretation and
enforcement by the police, the prosecution and the courts.
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court perceives its mandate to be
limited to the constitutional review of positive law. The decisions
impart the impression that no consideration was admitted of the
general context within which the protected laws have been, and
continue to be interpreted and enforced. That general context
88. On December 30, 2008, Chief Justice Harifin Tumpa issued Supreme
Court Circular Letter No. 14 to all courts in Indonesia in which he recommended
the judiciary to consult the Press Council on whether certain acts were or were
not defamatory, and seek to mediate the conflict in accord with the provisions of
the Press Law.
89. VIVA NEWS, August 14, 2009.
90. TEMPO INTERACTIVE, October 7, 2009, available at
http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/nasional/2009/10/07/brk,20091007201319,uk.html (last visited July 10, 2010).
91. Constitutional Court Decision Number 140/PUU-VII/2009, April 12,
2010.
92. Constitutional Court Decision Number 10-17-23/PUU-VII/2009, March
25, 2010.
93. Constitutional Court Decision Number 29/PUU-V/2007, April 30, 2008.
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discloses a field of abuses of power, arbitrary and selective
enforcement of the law, and miscarriages of justice within a
general atmosphere of corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
On the Corruption Perception Index list compiled by
Transparency International for 2009, Indonesia occupies the 111th
position on a list of 180 countries. The country shares the spot
with Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Kiribati, Mali, Solomon Islands, and
Togo. The recent exposures of widespread case brokerage
activities involving the judiciary, the prosecution, and the police,
have singled out the latter as the most corrupt institution in the
country. Its latest exploit consisted of jailing a whistle-blowing
police general, and the fabrication of indictments against two
deputy heads of the Corruption Eradication Commission.94 Two
prosecutors and a judge were indicted for brokering a tax evasion
case involving US$1.6 million. The judge confessed to having
received bribes to the amount of US$ 5,000.95 The head
prosecutor at the Attorney General’s office investigating a big
corruption matter was caught red-handed receiving a bribe of
US$660,000.96 To add spice to the context, on and around
November 5, 2009, Chief Justice Mohamad Mahfud Md. of the
Constitutional Court, ordered the Corruption Eradication
Commission to deliver tapes to the Court the contents, of which
had been circulating through mobile phones and computers. The
4.5-hour tapes, recording conversations between prosecutors, the
police and a judge, were played in a court and exposed a
conspiracy involving the law enforcement institutions and the
person accused of siphoning off cash from a failed bank which was
being bailed out with government money. The conspirators
fabricated a bribery case against two deputy heads of the
Corruption Eradication Commission. Coming out of the court
room, Chief Justice Mahfud was interviewed and caught on TV
saying how sad it was for him to witness law enforcers being
controlled like animals by financiers. In retaliation against the
playing of the tape, and saying unkind words about the police, the
entire police contingent on personal guard duty to the Chief Justice
and his family was withdrawn the next day.
94. THE JAKARTA GLOBE, October 5, 2009; THE JAKARTA POST, June 14,
2010.
95. THE JAKARTA POST, April 21, 2010; THE JAKARTA GLOBE WEBSITE,
April 14, 2010.
96. Nurlis E. Meuko, Misteri Aliran Dana Joko Versi Bibit, VIVA NEWS,
October 1, 2009, available at http://korupsi.vivanews.com/news/read/93712misteri_aliran_dana_djoko_versi_bibit (last visited July 10, 2010).
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The nine justices of the Constitutional Court do not work in a
vacuum. The very same context is a continuing source of concern,
worry, and fear for the ordinary citizen at the other end of
enforcement. It is this fear that they brought to the Court when
they asked for protection from the harshness, uncertainties, and
abuses of colonial laws which are frequently interpreted and
applied by less than caring police and the standing magistrature.
Almost without exception, they have been turned away emptyhanded. To wit, they have asked whether jailing journalists was
not too excessive considering that they already have to suffer the
obligation to abide by the victim’s right of response, the hefty
damages awards under Civil Code Article 1372, and the fines
mentioned in Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq. Perhaps the
jailing provisions could be found to be violating the freedom from
fear protected by the constitution? The Court would have none of
it.97 They asked the Court whether it was possible at all to stick to
the principle of equality before the law, and do away with the
colonial lèse majesté clauses and have the law treat insults directed
to the president and vice president the same way as insults aimed at
the citizen. The Court seemed a bit moved, and bent over
backwards to split the president and vice president in two. One
part is to be the person of the president. If the person feels
insulted, that part can resort to Criminal Code Article 310 et seq
like everybody else. The presidential part of the person, however,
is directed to Criminal Code Article 207, a no less colonial piece of
legislation than the abrogated lèse majesté articles.98 The decision
assumes that a presidency is susceptible to feelings of being
insulted.99 None of the petitions, however, mentioned that the
article violates the criminal law system. Nor did anybody raise the
matter of a step-wise walk in the direction of the police state which
concerned the writer of the end-note to the Keng Po (Pandeglang)
case in 1938.100
97. Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, August
15, 2008.
98. These would be Criminal Code Articles 134, 136bis, and 137. See infra
page 20-21 for a scholarly comment on the popularity of criminal code article
207 by colonial prosecutors.
99. But see, the Keng Po (Pandeglang) case, at infra pages 18 and 19 ; one
of the leading texts in Criminal Law insists that insult can only be inflicted
against a natural or biological person, a principle faithfully maintained in all
articles in the entire title XVI by consistently using the word “somebody” to
designate the victim of the insult and, as a consequence thereof, by using the
term “the deceased” in criminal code article 320 and 321.
100. T.149 at 74.
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The dissenting opinion to the decision offered some interesting
observations. It saw the president as distillation of the Indonesian
people so that the president is actually a personal manifestation of,
and represents the dignity and grandeur of the people (the personal
embodiment and representative of people dignity and majesty).
The opinion wanted more splits in the president, and produced
the president as a Head of State, a Head of Government, a
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and a Chief Diplomat,
all these functions are stipulated in the constitution, the implication
being that each part of a president may have different feelings of
being insulted. The dissent also quoted dicta allegedly cultivated
by the U.S. Supreme Court which the dissenting judge interpreted
as a refutation of the principle of equality before the law: The
principle of equality does not mean that every law must have
universal application for all who are not by nature, attainment or
circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of
different classes of persons often require separate treatment.101
No citation was given for the U.S. Supreme Court quotation. It
could either be taken out of context, or refer to differentiation
rather than discrimination. To allow maternity leave to women
and not to men is a recognition of difference, not a discrimination.
A legal system granting a right to some but not to others is
discriminative, as would be a law the breach of which is
punishable to the man-in-the-street, but not to journalists.
Granting the right to a public interest defense against accusations
of libel when the victim is a private individual, but withholding it
when the target of the insult is a government official is
discrimination.
To some, the description of a president, as the “distillation of
the people” conjures images of a dictatorship.102 The last time
Indonesia had a president called the voice of the people, the show
ended up in the most horrendous bloodbath the nation has known
in its modern history.103 The lèse majesté articles in the Indonesian
101. Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006,
at 74.
102. It also brings back recollections about the phrase “All animals are
equal, but some animals are more equal than others” in GEORGE ORWELL,
ANIMAL FARM (1945).
103. On September 30, 1965 a heavily armed contingent of the palace guard
murdered almost the entire general staff of the army. The support of the
Indonesian Communist Party, the largest party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, was
thought to be evident from editorials in the People’s Daily, the party’s agitprop
organ, and the almost immediate nationwide formation of Revolutionary
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Criminal Code were repealed in form, but promptly replaced in
essence. Criminal Code Articles 134, 136bis and 137 were
declared unconstitutional and devoid of force and effect. The
Constitutional Court replaced them with Criminal Code Articles
310 et seq and 207. The opinion of the slim majority of the
justices of the Court that there is no place in a democratic republic
with popular sovereignty for articles which contradict the principle
of equality before the law was not reflected in the decision.
Criminal Code Articles 154 et seq prohibit expressions of
hostility, hatred, and contempt towards the government of
Indonesia, hence the name hate-sowing articles. The petition to
declare the articles unconstitutional included the request to review
article 107 on rebellion, articles 160 and 161 on instigations to
disobey government measures, and articles 207-208 on insulting
government agencies.
Legal standing of petitioners were
recognized only in the case of the hate-sowing articles. The court
found the petitioners wanting of legal standing for the remaining
articles. The decision was passed by a thin majority of five to four.
The hate-sowing articles were to be scrapped because they are
formal offences, because they lend themselves to arbitrary
interpretation by the authorities, and because critique tended to be
easily qualified as an expression of hostility, hatred and contempt.
The decision pointed out that the Dutch Minister of Justice himself
stated that the hate-sowing provisions were meant to apply to
colonial communities, and definitely not fit to be taken over by the
realm in Europe. It is interesting to note that the majority thought
the articles irrational because it is just not possible that citizens of
an independent and sovereign country could be hostile towards
their own state and government. Nevertheless, the Court hailed the
government’s testimony which stated that the same provisions
have been maintained in the new draft criminal code, this time as
material offences.104

Councils. Within weeks the Party’s organization was paralyzed by massive
uprisings of non-communist political forces under the protection of army
elements. The resulting witch-hunt and massacres claimed the lives of people
estimated at between 60,000 to 200,000 men and women.
104. Constitutional Court Decision Number 6/PUU-V/2007, at 77-79.
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IX. A CLAUSE TO OVERTURN ALL CLAUSES
After its second amendment, the Constitution of Indonesia105
was said to contain a world-standard Bill of Rights.106 Chapter XA
on Human Rights contains 10 human rights clauses. It reads as if
the entire contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had
been condensed into one chapter and bravely inserted in the
Constitution. The way the clauses have been and continue to be
interpreted by the judiciary, however, have been a source of
serious concern to Indonesian as well as international rights
organizations. A recurrent theme in rejecting applications for
judicial review of oppressive criminal code provisions is the
didactically prescriptive balancing of rights and obligations, and
the consequent limitation of human rights. It is considered the
state’s duty to protect persons whose rights are violated by the
exercise of the freedoms of other persons. The nine human rights
articles in the Indonesian Constitution seem to be at the mercy of
Article 28J at the end of the list which allows their limitation by
statutory enactment.107 Of tremendous support to the potential
roll-back of rights provided by this clause is the similar clause in
Article 19 Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).108
Considerable support for
maintaining the oppressive anti-defamation laws is derived from
105. Resolved at the Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly
(“M.P.R.”) on August 18, 2000.
106. Simon Butt & Firmansyah Arifin, Corruption and the Judiciary in
Indonesia,
in
POLICY
BRIEFS
2
(2008),
available
at:
http://www.aigrp.anu.edu.au/publications/briefs.php (last visited July 10, 2010).
107. Indonesian Constitution, Chapter XA, Article 28J, Section (2):
In exercising his rights and freedoms, every person is obliged to submit
to limitations stipulated by law aimed exclusively to guarantee the
recognition of- and respect for the freedom rights of other persons and
for the satisfaction of just demands in accordance with moral, religious
values, security, and public order considerations in a democratic
society.
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19,
Paragraph 3:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
a. For respect for the rights and reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
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the translation of the term slander into the Indonesian language by
the word fitnah, a word of Arabic origin defined by the Qur’an as
an act more heinous than murder.109 The severity of punishment
for defamation in the secular codes thereby obtains solid
endorsement and legitimacy in religious doctrine. In independent
Indonesia, Fitnah and sedition are widely felt to be deserving of
more severe punishment, larger damage awards, bigger fines, and
longer jail sentences than was ever meted out by colonial
judiciaries.
It is not true that the Indonesian political elite has mobilized a
broad move to roll back freedoms which were already granted.
Restrictions on freedoms have always been present either by
products of colonial legislation, or by laws passed by rubber-stamp
parliaments under dictatorships during some 40 years, as well as
laws made in the everlasting so-called transition period towards
full democracy.110 It is this law-making aspect of the past, which
Harold J. Berman referred to as the law-based state, known in
Indonesia as the Rechtsstaat, or the system of Rule-by-Law, to
distinguish it from a system of Rule-of-Law.111 The unintended
implication of this distinction is that freedoms are more rooted in
the rule of law state, and that these are mostly found in common
law countries. The identifications, however, do not fit reality. The
109. THE HOLY QUR’AN, Surah 2, Al-Baqarah, verses 191 and 217.
110. President Sukarno dissolved the Indonesian Constituent Assembly,
seizes power on July 5, 1959, and established the national-democratic stage of
his revolution. On March 11, 1966 it was Suharto’s turn to wrest away power
from President Sukarno, and sets up a military dictatorship that lasted until
1998;
111. Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State
(Rechtsstaat), With Special Reference to the Soviet Union, in TOWARD THE
“RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION
PERIOD especially n. 11 (Donald D. Barry ed. 1992). Jeffrey Kahn explains the
Rule–by-Law as a consequence of the doctrine of representative democracy with
parliament being the exclusive actualizers of sovereignty of the people. Laws
made by elected representatives of those who hold the exclusive sovereignty of
the nation hold the supreme authority in the state. The legislature being an arm
of the state holds monopoly power over the making of laws. The executive state
enforces, while the judiciary implements. The concept is clinically neutral from
value judgments on the exercise of power by the state. Hence, Nazi Germany
was a Rechtsstaat, as was Stalin’s Soviet Union. “There is no substantive
prescription beyond the positivist procedural requirements of rule by laws.” See
JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
RUSSIA 54 (2002). The Rule of Law, on the other hand, is the system which
does not accept the state as the exclusive fountainhead of law. In common law
states the depoliticized courts have acted as a major source of law and what
Kahn called other normative standards.
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countries in Western Europe are rechtsstaat countries, yet their
states are not only subject to state-made laws, but to judge-made
laws, international law and tribunals as well. Closer to Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, both wedded to the common law system,
generate many complaints about “the blatant use of the criminal
law as a political instrument . . . harsh laws which censor public
opinion. . .” and then again “. . . established practice of Singapore
which routinely uses defamation and contempt charges against
foreign journalists and opposition politicians.”112 Much like
Indonesia, the legal infrastructure to restrict liberties already exists
in both Singapore and Malaysia. It is the heritage of colonial times
to which is added a newly set of enacted statutes after
independence to lend a local flavor to “foreign” legislation.113
In Indonesia, the inundation of the Constitutional Court with
petitions demanding the review of laws deemed obstructing the
free flow of information, opinions and critique stems from a
complex mental perspective. There is the thought ingrained in the
back of the professional mind by decades of experience at the
hands of dictatorship that the only threat to freedom of the press is
the closure of publications. Such was indeed the single deadly
measure the military regime unleashed unto critical media. The
euphoria which accompanied the passing of the Press Law 114 by a
parliament liberated by the fall of a dictator,115 brought the wrong
impression that the law will take care of all existing and potential
dangers confronting journalists and the media. Finally there was
the mixture of indignation, surprise, and panic at being faced by a
plethora of lawsuits filed by plaintiffs, some of whom would not
normally command the respect of the community, yet managed to
persuade the judiciary to mete out stiff sentences and large awards.
It was this complex of feelings, thoughts, and circumstances which
moved petitioners to demand constitutional reviews of laws
112. Kanishka Jayasurya, The Rule of Law and Regimes of Exception in
East Asia, Working Paper No. 96, Asia Research Center, Murdoch University,
July 2000, at 3.
113. For a treatment on the subject during the military dictatorship in
Indonesia, see Daniel S. Lev, Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian
State, 40 INDONESIA (Oct. 1985). Referring to the take-over of oppressive
colonial legislation by an independent Indonesia, Lev wrote: “It is not simply
that such legal provisions have been retained, but that their retention implies the
same understanding of political prerogative from which they originated,” id. at
73.
114. Law No.40 of 1999.
115. General Suharto was deposed in the wake of the monetary crisis of
1998.
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deemed hostile to press freedom. The Constitutional Court
rejected most of the demands, and acceded to some because other
laws, no less hostile, are or will be substituted for the statutes to be
repealed.
Human Rights Watch issued a most recent report on the state
of freedom of expression in Indonesia.116 It is a scathing
indictment against an excessively oppressive criminal defamation
law regime, and a willing law enforcement apparatus to pursue the
accuser rather than investigate the offence the plaintiff is accused
of. The report complains that in the hands of financially and
politically powerful personalities, criminal anti-defamation laws
become destructive implements against critique and opposition.
These laws are more susceptible to abuse and manipulation,
particularly when employed by government officials with
investigative authority backed by financially strong parties. The
Information & Electronic Transaction Law117 was singled out as
particularly hostile with its threat of imprisonment of up to 6 years,
a fine of up to Rp. 1 billion, and a possible pretrial detention.118
The bad conditions of freedom of the press in Indonesia seems
to be somewhat shared by its neighbors. Despite its bad report
card, Indonesia is deemed to have the freest press in Southeast
Asia by Reporters Without Borders. On its worldwide press
freedom index for 2009, Indonesia was given a score of 28.50,
over and above its neighbors. Eritrea stood at the bottom of the list
with a score of 115.5. Scandinavian countries and Ireland were on
top of the list and rated 0 (zero). It must have been a satisfying
sight for the Indonesian government to watch Indonesia leading its
neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in press
freedom.119

116. See, Turning Critics into Criminals, The Human Rights Consequences
of Criminal Defamation in Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 3, 2010,
available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/04/turning-critics-criminals
(last visited July 10, 2010).
117. Law No.11/2008 on Information & Electronic Transaction.
118. A petition for constitutional review of two articles in the law submitted
by citizens was squarely rejected by the Constitutional Court in its decision
Number 50/puu-VI/2008, on May 5, 2009.
119. On the Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index for
2009, Indonesia scored 28.50, above the Philippines (38.25), Thailand (44),
Malaysia (44.25), and Singapore (45). See, Press Freedom Index 2009,
available at http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html
(last visited July 10, 2010).
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X. TO CONCLUDE
The road to freedom meets a dead-end at Constitution junction.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is not ready to lead the nation
on the way to reform. The Court is resolved to maintain laws on
the books which were promulgated for the security and ease of law
enforcement in a colony. The Court also held on to statutes which
were enacted after independence by authoritarian regimes and
compliant parliaments. The only way out is to muddle through the
conventional judicial process and cope with its capricious
outcomes. That is not an easy task. There is no discernible
method in the way courts arrive at their decisions. This makes it
very difficult to navigate a way through the hazards planted in the
colonial civil and criminal codes, and the considerably more
hostile post-independence statutes. The use of such “insulting”
words as dumb,120 or thief,121 or scavenger,122 or Suharto Inc.123 is
punished, but so are complaints against allegedly fraudulent
sellers.124 A patient sending an e-mail to friends complaining of
maltreatment in a hospital,125 editors warning authorities not to
install an official who was still facing customs suits, and
consumers complaining about bad service through letters to the
editor are brought to trial. The Press Law of 1999 is not an
adequate bar against criminal prosecution or tort suits.126 An issue
of grave concern is that serious critique, and by any standard
necessary,127 directed against public authority, even if public

120. The Bersihar Lubis case. See supra notes 56 and 57.
121. The Indies Social Democratic Party Congress case in Bandung, Raad
van Justitie Batavia, Second Chamber, April 6, 1923, T.120 at 496-500.
122. The Tomy Winata v Tempo case, Central Jakarta Court of First
Instance, Decision No.233/Pdt.G/2003/P.N.Jkt.Pst, March 18, 2004.
123. The Suharto v Time Magazine case, Supreme Court Decision No.3215
K/PDT/200, August 30, 2007.
124. The North Jakarta Court of First Instance Decision Number
178/PDT/G/2007/PN.JKT.UT, in the Seng Seng case on May 6, 2008.
125. The celebrated case of Prita-of-the-Coins (nationwide contributions of
coins in support for the defense of Prita Mulyasari, a pregnant mother of two
being the first victim of pretrial detention under the Information & Electronic
Transaction Law); her criminal prosecution was dismissed by the Tangerang
Court of First Instance (Decision Number 1269/Pid.B/2009/PN.TNG), but the
prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court, while the hospital’s civil suit
against her awarded the plaintiff damages in the sum of Rp.204.000.000, an
amount she could not afford.
126. See supra notes 70-71.
127. See supra note 46.
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interest is judicially recognized remains punishable.128 On the
other hand, as if to increase the level of general uncertainty,
defendants who failed proving the truth of their allegedly libelous
accusations are pardoned.129 It seems as if a message is forcefully
imposed on the general public that complaints about bad treatment
or fraud by sellers of goods or services must be kept a secret
between the complainer and the complainee, or between the victim
and the police. Complaints must not be put in letters to the editor,
nor in e-mails if the latter is accessible by others. No bad words,
no critique, and no complaints.
All of these decisions were reached by courts by having the
facts meet with the law. This is how the law is interpreted,
applied, and enforced. This IS the law. There is no way in which
the law on the books can be clinically divorced from the way it is
operated in practice. Statements by justices at the Constitutional
Court that laws in operation are none of the Court’s business,
implying that the Court’s exclusive mandate is to mathematically
project a statute against provisions in the constitution. This
understanding is excessively legistic and lack support in the dicta,
holdings, and rulings in their own decisions.
The wait now is for more widespread publicity of decisions and
transparency in the process of decision-making. A more brief and
simplified version of law reports rather than the unnecessarily long
and repetitive texts of decisions should persuade commentators to
dwell more on the reasoning rather than the end result of court
decisions. Open discussions and the emergence of recognizable
doctrinal consensus in the civil and criminal law system of
Indonesia, acknowledged sources of law, should persuade the
judiciary to look beyond the black letter of the law in their search
for justice. For justice is also to be found among the practitioners,
enforcers, and those who receive its painful assaults. Nobody said
that change was going to be easy for a system that survived
centuries of feudal rule, colonial administration, and four decades
of post-independence dictatorships.

128. See supra note 36.
129. Time Inc. failed to prove allegations regarding Suharto’s shifting of
huge amounts of money between bank accounts in Switzerland and Austria.
Tempo was not able to prove that plaintiff Winata took an interest in the
rebuilding of one of the largest garment and textile markets in Asia. See supra
note 23, and notes 36 and 37.

